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Abstract 
Extant studies on the relationship between “domestic institutions, comparative advantage and 
international specialization” have largely focused on formal institutions. This paper contributes to 
this literature by focusing on domestic informal contracting institution vis-á-vis generalized trust 
as a source of comparative advantage. Employing a bilateral industry trade data, the paper finds a 
robust evidence that countries with high generalized trust level export relatively more in industries 
that that are prone to contractual frictions. Results on export margins further suggest that countries 
with high generalized trust level enter more markets, ship more products to each destination, and 
have higher export per product and export intensities in those industries. On the one hand, the 
results reemphasizes the importance of trust for improved economic performance. On the other 
hand, it offers explanation as to why a country though poorly endowed with weak formal domestic 
institutions may still have a comparative cost advantage in industries that are more prone to 
contractual frictions due to having strong domestic informal institutions such as generalized trust. 
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Highlights 
 Trust underlies virtually every economic activity. 
 One of the ways trust affects economic activities is by reducing contractual frictions, i.e. 
uncertainties and opportunistic behaviors that may arise in contractual relations. 
 The paper tests whether trust, by reducing contractual frictions, affects a country’s 
international specialization pattern.  
 Results show that industries that are more prone to contractual frictions experience 
relative better export performances in high trusting countries, which is indicative that 
trust reduces contractual friction and this shift a country’s international specialization 
pattern towards industries that are more prone to contractual frictions. 
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“Efficient exchange relations are facilitated when the parties trust each other. This is 
particularly important when specific investments or unobserved efforts are important. The 
presence of trust transforms an exchange relation characterized by ex post bilateral 
monopoly by: reducing the costs of specification, monitoring and guarding against 
opportunistic behavior; encouraging better investment decisions; and ensuring rapid and 
flexible responses to unforeseen events”   
                                                                                        ------ (Lyons and Mehta, 1997 p.1) 
 
1. Introduction 
Although conventional trade theories emphasize technology and factor accumulation as sources of 
comparative advantage and international specialization, more recent research underlines the 
importance of domestic institutions in these regards (Levchenko, 2007; Nunn, 2007; Ma, Qu and 
Zhan, 2010; Broner, Bustos and Carvalho, 2012; Manova, 2013). Importantly, a strand of this 
literature argues that better domestic institutional quality and contract enforcement shift a 
country’s comparative advantage towards industries that are more vulnerable to contractual 
frictions, say, due to holdup problems that often arise in relationship specific-investments 
(Levchenko, 2007; Nunn, 2007; Ma et al., 2010). However, this literature has largely focused on 
formal institutional quality and contract enforcement such as property rights, shareholders rights, 
and judicial quality. This paper extends this literature by focusing on informal institution vis-á-vis 
generalized trust which has been unduly ignored in the literature.  
 
The theoretical underpinning for considering such a nexus builds on the well-established literature 
suggesting that trust induces self-enforcing contracts through reputation effects, norms of 
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reciprocity, peer monitoring and social pressure, flexibility and information exchange (Arnott and 
Stiglitz, 1991; Knack and Keefer, 1997; Lyons and Mehta, 1997; Dyer and Chu, 2003). Because 
high generalized trust level is associated with more effective and efficient contract enforcement, 
or reduces the need for (more expensive) formal contracting,1 countries endowed with more 
trusting and trustworthy people will have a cost saving advantage in industries that are more prone 
to contractual frictions referred hereafter as “contract intensive industries”. In line with this 
theoretical reasoning, this paper evaluates whether countries characterized by high generalized 
trust level specialize in contract intensive industries. I test this hypothesis using a bilateral export 
data of 76 countries’ exports in 27 industries over the period spanning 1996-2008.  
 
My empirical strategy builds on the factor proportion model developed by Rajan and Zingales 
(1998), which has been elevated in the trade literature on the determinants of international 
specialization (Romalis, 2004; Nunn, 2007; Levchenko, 2007; Manova, 2013). The model allows 
a flexible framework to test my hypothesis by simply examining how the interaction of country-
specific indicator of generalized trust level and industry-specific indicator of contractual friction 
vulnerability affects exports. As an empirical measure of generalized trust, I use the trust indicator 
from the World Value Survey, measured as the proportion of a country’s population that “agrees” 
with the statement, “Most people can be trusted”. I identify industries’ susceptibility to contractual 
frictions by using Nunn (2007) “contract intensity index” which measures, for each industry, the 
proportion of its intermediate inputs that are not traded on spot markets. Because these inputs are 
not traded on spot market, they require relationship specific-investments which make them prone 
to contractual frictions in the absence of high generalized trust level, or effective formal 
contracting institution which has been the focus of existing studies.  
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To forestall the results, I find that high generalized trust level, by reducing contractual frictions, 
leads to a disproportionately better export performances in contract intensive industries. This result 
holds after controlling for fixed effects at the country and industry levels, and after employing 
alternative estimation strategies including the Helpman, Melitz and Rubinstein (2008) 2-stage 
estimation procedure and Santos and Tenreyro (2006) Pseudo Poisson Maximum Likelihood to 
address zero trade observations. The result also remains robust after accounting for other sources 
of comparative advantage that have been identified in the literature such as human and physical 
capital endowment, financial development, natural resource endowment, and even formal 
contracting institution. Decomposing exports into the extensive and intensive margins to further 
underpin possible pathways generalized trust level affects exports, the results suggest that 
countries with high generalized trust level export relatively more in contract intensive industries 
because they enter more markets, ship wider range of goods to each destination, and have higher 
export per product and export intensities.  
 
In addition to being related to the broader literature examining the effect of domestic institutions 
on the patterns of international trade specialization (Levchenko, 2007; Nunn, 2007; Manova, 
2013), this paper contributes to a growing body of literature on the international trade effect of 
trust. Pioneer studies in this literature consider bilateral trust between exporter and importer to be 
“transaction cost reducing” and argue that enhancing bilateral trust between both parties will 
increase bilateral trade (Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales, 2009; Yu, Sjoerd and de Haan, 2015; Spring 
and Grossmann, 2016; Xing and Zhou, 2018; Melitz and Toubal, 2019). To test this hypothesis, 
available studies regress bilateral trade volume on bilateral trust.2 Roy, Munasib and Chen (2014) 
make an important deviation from this literature by arguing that social trust, as an informal 
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institution, affects trade by facilitating access to informal financing in financially underdeveloped 
economies. To test their hypothesis, the authors interact social trust indicator with a dummy 
variable indicating whether or not a country is financially developed. My study deviates from these 
previous studies because it focuses on how generalized trust level, through its effect on contractual 
frictions, may lead to an international specialization. It further deviates from existing studies 
because it decomposes the export effect of generalized trust into the extensive and the intensive 
margins to underpin the channel(s) through which generalized trust affects export. Finally, this 
paper can be placed in the broader literature on trust and economic performances (Putnnam, 1993; 
Knack and Keefer, 1997; Zak and Knack, 2001) 
 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents a theoretical framework 
which informs the empirical analysis. Section 3 discusses the research methodology, specifying 
the empirical model and different data sources used in the analysis. Section 4 presents the empirical 
results, while Section 5 concludes.  
 
2. Theoretical Background 
Trust is a “particular level of subjective probability with which an agent assesses that another agent 
or group of agents will perform a particular action” (Gambetta, 1988). Two types of trust emerge 
from this definition: generalized and personalized trust. Generalized trust refers to the 
preconception an agent or a group of agent have on others while, personalized trust refers to the 
preconception an agent or group of agent have on a “known” agent or group of agents. My 
analytical setting views trust as an institution that underpins and enforces contractual relation. 
Williamson (1991) recognizes the importance of the “institutional environment” in this regards, 
7 
 
but argued that such an environment must apply equally to all actors in a given context or national 
culture. Accordingly, I focus on generalized trust also known as interpersonal or social trust, since 
it nests Williamson’s notion on what constitutes an “institutional environment”.  
 
Together with social norm and networks, generalized trust forms part of social capital (Putnam, 
1993). However, numerous studies have underscored it as the core of social capital, affecting 
different economic, social and political activities and outcomes (Bjørnskov, 2006). For example, 
Knack (2001, p.1) notes that the relative payoffs of production and predation are not only 
determined by formal mechanisms of contract enforcement and property right protection, but also 
by social norms and interpersonal trust. Among others, the latter is possible because it provide 
mutual assurance on compliance to a binding contract between implied parties thereby reducing 
uncertainties and opportunistic behaviors, i.e. contractual frictions, which are pervasive in 
contractual relations even in a country with strong contract enforcing institution. 
  
High generalized trust level can reduce contractual frictions in so many ways, perhaps the most 
obvious is that in a high trusting society, being opportunistic even when the opportunity arises and 
the financial benefits are enormous would go contrary to the society’s ingrained moral values and 
it usually attracts social sanctions and stigmas. Lyons and Mehta (1997) note that such social 
sanctions and stigmas are experienced both within and outside the boundaries of the exchange 
relation. In other words, it is costly being untrustworthy in a trustworthy society. High generalized 
trust level may also reduce contractual friction by lowering the amount of time and resources 
contracting parties devote to ex post bargaining and haggling over problems that arise in the course 
of exchange. This is due to mutual confidence among contracting parties that unanticipated events 
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will be fairly addressed and remedied (Dyer and Chu, 2003), and the expectation that the 
contracting partner will reciprocate in the future (Dore, 1983). But generalized trust do not only 
affect ex post contract inefficiencies as the forgoing arguments may suggest, it affects also ex ante 
investment incentives.  
 
For example, the preponderance of trust can lead to the establishment of widespread network of 
social relations (Galardo, Lozzi and Mistulli, 2017). Supposing a contractual relation were to be 
entered by a producer and an input supplier wherein the implied parties are part of the said social 
network, this may help reduce information asymmetry about the input supplier since information 
are easily shared within a highly interconnected community. Such soft information could include 
whether a supplier can produce goods of a given quality, or can deliver the said goods on time 
(Lyons and Mehta, 1997). Generalized trust also promotes ex ante negotiating efficiency by 
allowing for greater flexibility to respond to changing market conditions and because contracting 
parties have greater confidence that information provided by each party is not misrepresented 
(Dyer and Chu, 2003). Along this line, Knack and Keefer (1997, p.1252), note that in societies 
characterized by high generalized trust level, “written contracts are less likely to be needed, and 
they do not have to specify every possible contingency. Finally, while the above discussions 
presuppose the existentiality of formal contract wherein generalized trust induces self-enforcing 
formal contracts, it may also be that higher generalized trust level lead to fewer formal contracts 
being made since parties believe they can create binding obligation by shaking hands (Lyons and 
Mehta, 1997; Adler, 2001). 
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How then does generalized trust lead to specialization in contract intensive industries, i.e. 
industries that are more vulnerable to contractual frictions? While the forgoing discussions on 
generalized trust and contractual frictions has been general, I assume that an industry’s 
susceptibility to contractual frictions is an exogenous component that is technologically 
determined by the nature of production. A notable example of this would be a scenario wherein 
production in an industry do not rely on spot markets for inputs, but require relationship specific-
investments to be made. Because this investment is unlikely to have much value outside the 
relationship and due to the irreversibility of investment once it is made, implied parties as rational 
agents are either more reluctant to enter into the proposed relationship or provide low level of 
relationship specific-investments when they enter into it. In either case, it introduces inefficiency 
or the well-known classical holdup problem which drives up production cost (Klein, Crawford and 
Alchian., 1978; Williamson, 1985). Possible ways of reducing this inefficiency include writing a 
binding long-term contracts or assigning property rights in a way that distributes the residual rights 
of control (Levcheko, 2007 p.795). This is the premise upon which prior studies evaluate how 
better domestic institutional quality and contract enforcement shift a country’s comparative 
advantage towards contract intensive industries by reducing underinvestment and increasing 
efficient cost business contracting. 
 
However, based on the contractual friction reducing effects of generalized trust divulged earlier, 
it is safe to aver that high generalized trust level offers investment and cost contracting gains 
similar to those of formal institutions. In fact, the prevailing wisdom within economics and social 
sciences as a whole is that informal institutions such as trust either complement or substitute formal 
contracting institutions where the government is either unable or unwilling to provide one (Knack 
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and Keefer, 1997; Mccannon, Asaad and Wilson, 2017). Other things equal, countries endowed 
with more trusting and trustworthy people are less likely to suffer from underinvestment and more 
likely to have cost advantages in those industries that produce final goods that intensively use 
inputs requiring relationship specific-investments. Therefore, the production of final goods and 
exports in those industries should experience a relative faster increase. 
 
3. Research Methodology 
3.1. Empirical Strategy 
To test the hypothesis that countries with high generalized trust level experience relatively better 
export performances in contract intensive industries, I estimate the following baseline equation: 
 𝜌𝑠𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝜒𝑖 + 𝜒𝑗 + 𝜒𝑠 + 𝜒𝑡 + 𝛽0𝑻𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽1𝑧𝑠𝑻𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 + 𝜀𝑠𝑖𝑗𝑡       (1) 
 
where 𝜌𝑠𝑖𝑗𝑡  is the export value in industry s from country i to j in period t. 𝜒𝑡  is year effect which 
is included to control for unobserved time-specific effects. Following Baldwin and Taglioni 
(2006), the term also controls for a deflation problem, with the trade data being expressed in current 
values. 𝜒𝑖, 𝜒𝑗 and 𝜒𝑠 are exporter, importer, and industry fixed effects which account for both the 
panel unobserved heterogeneity and Multilateral Resistance Terms. 𝑻𝑖𝑡−1 is a measure of country 
generalized trust which is lagged one period to further minimize any potential reverse causality 
running from comparative advantage to social trust.3 𝑧𝑠 is a measure of contract intensity in 
industry s. I exclude the individual effect of 𝑧𝑠 from equation (1) as it is already subsumed in the 
industry fixed effects. As a robustness check however, I report results with two alternative 
specifications in the baseline results. First, I remove the industry fixed effects and control for the 
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industry contract intensity. Second, I interact the industry contract intensity indicator with time 
dummies and see if the effect changes over time. As additional control variables, I account for 
conventional gravity model variables such as (log) exporter and importer gross domestic products 
per capita (𝑙𝑛 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝𝑐) and bilateral trade cost variables such as: bilateral distances (ln 𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇), 
common border (𝐵𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟), and Common language (𝐶𝑂𝑀𝐿𝐴𝑁), and Bilateral trade agreements 
(𝐹𝑇𝐴). Finally, 𝜀𝑠𝑖𝑗𝑡  is the idiosyncratic error term. I estimate the baseline equation using OLS 
estimator. 
 
Consistent to the theoretical framework in section 2, I am interested in the export effect of 
generalized trust through the “contractual friction reducing channel”. Equation (1) therefore 
explains bilateral industry export activity by interacting industry characteristic with country 
characteristic, 𝑧𝑠𝑇𝑖𝑡−1. Therefore, 𝛽1 is the coefficient of interest and it is expected be positive and 
statistically significant at all time, suggesting that countries characterized by high generalized trust 
level export relatively more in industries more prone to contractual frictions i.e. contract intensive 
industries. As indicated in the introduction, this empirical strategy builds on the seminal work of 
Rajan and Zingales (1998) that interacted industries’ indicator of external finance dependence with 
a national indicator of financial development to study the impact of financial development on the 
output growth of credit constrained industries.  
 
3.2. Data 
As an empirical measure of generalized trust level, this study relies on the perception based trust 
indicator from the World Value Survey (WVS) which has become the standard trust indicator. It 
is measured as the proportion of a country’s population that “agrees” with the statement, “Most 
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people can be trusted”. Since this variable measures generalized trust, it meets the institutional 
environment. Different studies have employed this variable to evaluate the effect of informal 
institution on different socioeconomic outcomes (Zak and Knack, 2001; Roy, Munasib and Chen, 
2014). This variable is directly extracted from the CANA Dataset (Castellacci and Natera, 2011) 
for a sample comprising 76 countries over the period spanning 1996-2008.4 However, the original 
data comes from the WVS, a cross-country based survey data that is collected since the 1981 albeit 
countries enter the survey at different point in time. The values of the trust variable in the sample 
range from a low value of 0.028 in Brazil in 1997 to a high value of 0.742 percent in Norway in 
2008. The mean value is 0.27 with a standard deviation of 0.132. Countries at the 75th percentile 
have a score value of 0.337 while those at the 25th percentile have a score value of 0.181. 
 
Data on export is taken from the BACI-CEPII database at the 6-digit Harmonized System 
Classification (HSC) for which there are corresponding explanatory variables over the sample 
period. I then use a concordance table to map the 6-digit HSC products into the 3-digit category in 
the ISIC Revision 2 Industry Classification.5 Because I am interested in how generalized trust level 
affects exports and the channels through which this effects come about, I derive 6 outcomes 
variables from the resulting trade data: (i) total export value (𝑋𝑠𝑖𝑗) in industry s in country i's export 
to country j; (ii) number of 6-digit HSC products (𝑁𝑠𝑖𝑗) in industry s in country i’s export to country 
j; (iii) number of markets destinations (𝑀𝑠𝑖) in industry s country i export to; (iv) average export 
per product (?̅?𝑠𝑖𝑗) in industry s in country i to j; and (v) export intensity (𝑘𝑠𝑖𝑗) in industry s in 
country i to j. Following recent developments in the literature (Manova, 2013; Ndubuisi and Foster, 
2019; Dutt, Mihov and van Zandt, 2013; etc.), I define (ii)-(iii) as the extensive export margin, 
while (iv)-(v) are defined as the intensive export margin. 
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𝑋𝑠𝑖𝑗  is calculated as the sum of HSC product value in industry s from country i to j. Its values in 
my dataset range from a low value of 0 (for zero trade observations) or 1000 (for positive trade 
observations) to a high value of 32100000 (in thousands) in industry 383 (i.e. Transport 
Equipment) from Germany to France in 2008. I calculate 𝑁𝑠𝑖𝑗 and 𝑀𝑠𝑖 as a simple count of the 
number of products and market destinations in industry s, respectively. The values of 𝑁𝑠𝑖𝑗 in my 
dataset range from a low value of 0 (for zero trade observations) or 1 product (for positive trade 
observations) to a high value of 657 products in industry 351 (i.e. Industrial Chemicals) from 
Germany to France in 1999. On the other hand, the values of 𝑀𝑠𝑖 in the sample dataset range from 
a low value of 0 (for zero market destination) or 1 (for positive market destination observations) 
to a high value of 216 market destinations6 in industry 382 (i.e. Machinery, exc. Electricals) from 
Germany in 2007 or 2008.  I calculate the average value of export per product in industry s by 
country i to j as: 
 
                                    ?̅?𝑠𝑖𝑗 = 𝑋𝑠𝑖𝑗 𝑁𝑠𝑖𝑗⁄                                 … (2) 
 
The value of ?̅?𝑠𝑖𝑗  in the sample dataset range from a low value of 0 (for zero trade observation) or 
1 (in for positive trade observations) to a high value of 2204581 (in thousands) in industry 353 
(i.e. Petroleum Refineries) from Venezuela to Singapore in 2008. Finally, the export intensity in 
industry s by country i to j is calculated as:  
                                        𝑘𝑠𝑖𝑗 = 𝑉𝑠𝑖𝑗𝑡𝑉𝑖𝑡 𝑉𝑠𝑤𝑗𝑡𝑉𝑤𝑡⁄                                    … (3) 
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Where 𝑉𝑠𝑖𝑗𝑡  is the volume of export in industry s by country i to j in period t, while 𝑉𝑖𝑡  is the total 
volume of export country i to the world. 𝑉𝑠𝑤𝑗𝑡  is the volume of export in industry s by a reference 
country (all country in my sample) to country j in period t, while 𝑉𝑤𝑡 is the total volume of export 
by the reference country. The values of 𝑘𝑠𝑖𝑗  in my dataset range from a low value of 0 to a high 
value of 0.378 in industry 353 (i.e. Petroleum Refineries) from Indonesia to India in 1999. 
 
For the industry measure of contractual friction, I use the industry contract intensity computed by 
Nunn (2007). Rauch (1999) classifies internationally traded goods into three: those traded on 
organized exchanges, those not traded on organized exchanges but are reference priced in trade 
publications, and all other commodities. Nunn (2007) combines this classification with the 1997 
United States Input-Output Use Table to identify the types and shares of intermediate inputs used 
in the production of each final good. To ascertain whether the investments needed to produce an 
intermediate input require relationship specific-investment, the author used whether or not the 
intermediate input is quoted on an organized exchange, and whether or not it is reference priced in 
a trade publication (Nunn, 2007: p.575). He argued that products whose production relies more 
heavily on intermediate inputs that are neither quoted on organized exchange nor referenced priced 
in trade publications are more prone to the holdup problem. That is, the input supplier may either 
halt or threaten to halt its supply at any time, thereby requiring the producer to write a contract 
with input supplier. Accordingly, he constructs the first contract intensity 𝑍𝑠1 for each industry, as 
the share of intermediate inputs not traded on open market required to produce each final goods in 
that industry.  
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Nunn (2007) also developed a second index 𝑍𝑠2 which is measured as the share of intermediate 
goods not sold on open market together with those which are reference priced in trade publications 
required for production in each industry. He argued that inputs not sold on an exchange but 
referenced in trade publications can be thought of as having an intermediate level of relationship 
specificity, since trade publications are only produced if there is a sufficient number of purchasers 
of the publication. Since I am interested in contractual frictions in the least possible ways, I use 𝑍𝑠2 in all our analysis. As a robustness check, however, I report baseline results using 𝑍𝑠1. Table A2 
in the appendix displays the industry contract intensity measures. The mean value for 𝑍𝑠2 is 0.865. 
The industry at the 75th percentile is 362 i.e. glass and glass products i.e. 362 (with a value of 
0.967), while the industry at the 25th percentile is 321 i.e. Textile (with a value of 0.82). 
 
Finally, all gravity model variables are also taken from the BACI-CEPII database. With the 
exception of Distance which is measured in kilometers per distance, the other bilateral trade costs 
variables are dummies which take the value of one if the country-pairs are common in those 
dimensions and zero otherwise.  
 
<<Insert Table 1>> 
 
4. Empirical Results 
This section proceeds in three sub-sections. The first section presents the baseline regression 
results. The second section presents the robustness checks on the former. The third section presents 
the results on the differential impact of generalized trust level on export margins. 
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4.1. Bilateral Export Flows: Main Result 
Table 1 shows the baseline regression results using generalized trust level and the Nunn (2007) 
industry contract intensity as an empirical measure of industry susceptibility to contractual friction. 
The dependent variable for each reported regression in Table 1 is bilateral industry exports (log) 
while the standard errors are all clustered at the country-pair level. I begin by reporting the result 
when I only regress bilateral industry export on generalized trust and its interaction with industry 
contract intensity in Column 1. As the result shows, there is a strong evidence of heterogeneity 
across industries in line with the hypothesis. The estimated coefficient of 𝑧𝑠𝑻𝑖𝑡−1 is positive and 
statistically significant at all conventional levels, suggesting that countries endowed with high 
generalized trust level export relatively more in contract intensive industries. Column 2 includes 
conventional gravity model variables as specified in the baseline equation (1) and the results show 
that my initial result holds in both qualitative and quantitative terms.  
 
The result is also economically meaningful. Based on the coefficient estimates of 7.994 in column 
2, the result suggests a one standard deviation expansion in generalized trust level contributes 
positively to bilateral export by 91.3 percentage points. In my sample, the average industry export 
value is 6.540 percentage point while the maximum industry export value is 17.284 percentage 
point. Therefore, the 91.3 percentage point increase is substantial in economic terms. To provide 
further context, when I consider how generalized trust level affects exports in industries with 
varying levels of contractual friction in my sample, bilateral export for an industry with a mean 
contractual friction of 0.865 increase by 107.9 percent in a country with generalized trust level at 
the 75th percentile compared to a country with generalized trust level at the 25th percentile. 
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The remaining columns in the table provide some initial robustness check on the baseline results. 
Column 3 reports the result when I replace the industry fixed effect with industry contract intensity 
indicator. The estimated coefficient of 𝑧𝑠𝑻𝑖𝑡−1 retains both the initial statistical significance level 
and the expected signs. As expected, the estimated coefficient of the industry contract intensity 
measure alone is negative, suggesting a trade reducing effect of contractual frictions. Column 4 
emerges when I interact the industry contract intensity indicator with time dummies. Again, the 
result on the estimated coefficient of 𝑧𝑠𝑻𝑖𝑡−1 is consistent with those reported in previous columns. 
Although the preceding columns control for MRT by using importer and exporter fixed effects as 
suggested by Feenstra (2004), more recent research suggests using time-varying exporter and 
importer fixed effects to proxy MRT in a time-varying panel data because many of the trade cost 
factors could change over time (Baldwin and Taglioni, 2006). Therefore, Column 5 reports the 
result when I include time-varying importer and exporter fixed effects. The obtained result on the 
estimated coefficient of 𝑧𝑠𝑻𝑖𝑡−1 is generally consistent with those reported in the previous 
columns.  
 
Next, Column 6 replaces the industry and year fixed effects with time-varying industry fixed 
effects to control for potential influences of time-varying industry factors on trade while Column 
7 reports the result when I include country-pair fixed effects to account for the impact of 
unobserved heterogeneity at the country-pair level. In both cases, the results on the variable of 
interest is consistent with its previous estimates in suggesting that countries with high generalized 
trust level have comparative advantage in industries more prone to contractual frictions. Regarding 
the control variables, across each specified model in the Table, the estimated coefficients are all 
statistically significant at 1 percent and have the a priori expected signs. Finally, Table A3 in the 
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appendix replicates Table 1 using Nunn (2007)’s second industry contract intensity indicator. The 
results are consistent with those reported in Table 1 albeit the sizes of the estimated coefficients 
on the variables of interest are now smaller. 
 
<<Insert Table 2>> 
 
4.2. Bilateral Export Flows: Additional Robustness Checks 
4.2.1. Potential Confounding Factors 
Though my analysis focuses on generalized trust and how its interaction with industry contractual 
friction determine the composition of exports, the broader trade literature documents other country 
and industry characteristics that affect the composition of trade. Results reported in Table 1 would 
be biased if either generalized trust level (industry contract intensity) is correlated with these other 
country (industry) characteristics. To address this concern, Table 2 displays the results when I 
control for other country characteristics interacted with their respective industry characteristics. 
To conserve space, I report results only using industry, and time-varying exporter and importer 
fixed effects. The results are however robust to other specifications as in Table 1.7 In Column 1–
4, the estimated coefficient of 𝑧𝑠𝑇𝑖𝑡−1 is positive and statistically significant at all conventional 
levels as expected. Importantly, introducing these variables individually in Column 1-4 and jointly 
in Column 5 only marginally affect the sizes of the estimated coefficients of variables of interest. 
These results indicate that the observed effect of generalized trust level on comparative advantage 
by reducing contractual frictions is independent of these other sources of comparative advantages.  
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In column 6, I control for formal contracting institution 𝑄𝑖𝑡 – rule of law – interacted with industry 
contract intensity.8 The estimated coefficient of 𝑧𝑠𝑄𝑖𝑡 is positive and statistically significant. The 
result is therefore consistent with those reported in previous studies (Nunn, 2007; Levchenko, 
2007; Ma et al., 2010).  For 𝑧𝑠𝑇𝑖𝑡−1, the estimated coefficient falls from initial point estimate of 
7.997 in Column 5 of Table 1 to 3.394, but retains both the statistical significance level and 
expected sign. In an unreported result, I find that this result is robust to using “contract 
enforcement” indicator from the heritage foundation indicators and when all variables are jointly 
included in Column 7. The consistent positive estimated coefficient for 𝑧𝑠𝑄𝑖𝑡  and 𝑧𝑠𝑇𝑖𝑡−1 suggest 
that both are pathways of reducing contractual frictions. 
 
Turning now to other sources of comparative advantage, the estimated coefficient of physical 
capital, human capital, and natural resources with industries’ respective factor intensities in 
Column 1-3 are all statistically significant and have the expected signs.9 These results are 
consistent with existing literature (Braun, 2003; Nunn, 2007; Levchenko, 2007). In Column 4, the 
estimated coefficient of financial development interacted with external finance dependence is 
consistent with Manova (2013), and suggests that financially developed economies export 
relatively more in financially constrained industries.10 When these variables are jointly added in 
Column 5, the results are consistent with previous estimates with the exception been capital 
endowment interacted with capital intensity that turns statistically insignificant. In Column 8, I 
compare how the effect of generalized trust level fares in comparison with other sources of 
comparative advantage. For this, I rerun the model estimated in Column 7 with the standardized 
beta coefficients of traditional sources of comparative advantage together with trust, rule of law, 
and financial development. As can be seen in Column 8, human capital plays a much greater role. 
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This is followed by financial development and formal contracting institution. Generalized trust 
only outperforms natural resource endowment as a source of comparative advantage.  
 
<<Insert Table 3>> 
 
While results in Table 2 clearly indicate that generalized trust underlies successful contractual 
relation in contract intensive industries with or without formal contracting institutions, it may well 
be that the differential effect of generalized trust observed earlier is a proxy for some other feature 
of countries in those industries. To address this concern, I rerun my basic specification with full 
sets of interaction terms variables comprising the industry contract intensity indicator and country 
level endowment variables. The results are reported in column 1-4 of Table 3. In column 5, I 
interact (log) exporter GDP pc with industry contract intensity to isolate any effect due to the 
overall development of the country that generalized trust may be picking. In all cases, I find that 
my initial results remain virtually unchanged even when I jointly include these variables in column 
6. This suggests that generalized trust exert an independent influence in contract intensive 
industries, an effect I argue is by reducing contraction frictions either by ensuring more effective 
and efficient contract enforcement, or by reducing the need for (expensive) formal contracting.  
 
<<Insert Table 4>> 
 
4.2.2. Dealing with Zero Trade 
A potential source of selection bias while estimating gravity model is the omission of zero trade 
observations, which are common in gravity model. In my case this accounts for approximately 
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41.2 percent of the dyad trade links. Results displayed in Table 1 may therefore be susceptible to 
this bias since the estimation was achieved with only positive trade observations and excluded zero 
trade observations may not be random. To address this concern, I implement the Helpman et al. 
(2008) two-stage estimation procedure and Santos and Tenreyro (2006) Pseudo Poisson Maximum 
Likelihood (PPML) estimator. Although these approaches have become common in the trade 
literature in dealing with zero trade observations, the PPML has the added advantage of solving 
the problem with bias and inefficiency in the presence of heteroskedasticity that is pervasive in 
trade data which OLS and other estimators that require non-linear transformations fail to take care 
of.  
 
The first-stage equation of the Helpman et al. (2008) two-stage estimation procedure is a Probit 
selection equation with the dependent taking a value of one for positive exporter-industry-importer 
pairs and zero otherwise, while the second-stage is a trade flow equation. The dependent variable 
in the latter is the log bilateral industry exports value by destination. The implementation of the 
procedure requires the use of an empirical proxy for the fixed costs of international trade, which 
affects firm export status but not the level of their export. Following their study and Manova 
(2013), I consider two sets of excluded instruments associated with regulation costs of firm entry: 
number of days of days to register a business (cost1) and the number of legal procedures, and the 
relative cost to GDP per capita for an entrepreneur to start operating a business (cost2). Data on 
these variables are taking from the World Bank Development Indicators. For each of them, I take 
the log mean value for the exporting and importing countries and obtain two costs proxies that 
could be linked to export of each country pair. Using these variables as exclusion instrument is 
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informed by the fact that countries with regulatory barriers to start domestic business are likelier 
to face barriers to export. 
 
As the result in Column 1 of Table 4 confirms, higher regulatory costs of doing business reduces 
the probability of export market participation. Interestingly, the estimated coefficient of 𝑧𝑠𝑻𝑖𝑡_1 is 
positive and statistically significant at all conventional level. This suggests that countries endowed 
with more trusting and trustworthy people are likelier to enter a given market and form new trade 
relationship, and this effect is even stronger in industries more vulnerable to contractual frictions. 
This provides a first empirical evidence of a potential differential effect of trust on the extensive 
margin. Column 2 report the Helpman et al. (2008) second-stage regression result. The result is 
consistent with those reported in Table 1. Finally, Column 3 reports the result for the PPML. The 
dependent variable here is industry exports value by destination at levels. As can be seen, the result 
on the variable of interest is consistent with previous estimates in qualitative and quantitative 
terms. Overall, the result reported in Table 4 lend credence to the hypothesis that countries with 
high generalized trust level have comparative cost advantage in contract intensive industries. 
 
<<Insert Table 5>> 
 
4.3. Export Margins 
In this section, I gauge the channel(s) through which generalized trust affects export by examining 
its impact on the extensive and intensive export margins. As indicated in section 3.2, the extensive 
margin is defined here as the (i) number of 6-digit HSC product in industry s in country i’s export 
to country j in period t; and (ii) the number of market destinations in industry s country i exports 
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to in period t. These two definitions capture the idea of product and market diversification. Product 
diversification result either through the expansion of existing products or introduction of new 
products. High generalized trust level for example, by reducing contractual frictions especially for 
relationship specific-investments, firms become more productive in terms of production scale, 
time, and inventiveness. Accordingly, they are able to produce and ship wider range of goods, and 
enter more markets. 
 
Columns 1 and 2 in Table 6 confirm that indeed countries endowed with high generalized trust 
level ship a wider range of goods per destination in contract intensive industries. I test the 
robustness of this result by accounting for other sources of comparative advantage (Column 1 in 
Table A3 in the appendix) and zero trade observations by using the Helpman (2008) 2-stage 
estimation procedure (Column 3 in Table A4 in the appendix) or the Santos and Tenreyro (2006) 
PPML method (Column 2 in Table A4 in the appendix). In all cases, I find that my initial result 
holds. The coefficient estimate of 2.467 in Column 1 suggest that a one standard deviation 
expansion in generalized trust level contributes positively to the number of traded products by 
28.16 percentage points for an industry with an average contract intensity of score of 0.865. When 
I consider the distribution of generalized trust in my data, the result further indicates that the 
number of traded products for an industry with an average contractual friction score of 0.865 
increase by 38.49 percent in a country with generalized trust level at the 75th percentile compared 
to a country with generalized trust level at the 25th percentile. 
 
Next, Column 3 and 4 display the result on the number of market destinations in an industry. The 
number of observation falls to 24,506 since I collapse the importer dimension of the data in order 
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to count the number of market destinations. The estimated coefficient on the variable of interest is 
positive and statistically significant at all conventional levels, confirming that countries with high 
generalized trust level enters significantly more markets in contract intensive industries. I test the 
robustness of this result to accounting for other sources of comparative advantage (Column 4 in 
Table A3 in the appendix) and find my initial result holds. Here, although the zero observation 
accounts for less than 1 percent of the observation, I still control for zero observations using the 
Santos and Tenreyro (2006) PPML (Column 5 in Table A4 in the appendix) and the Helpman 
(2008) 2-stage estimation procedure (Column 6 in Table A4 in the appendix). I find that my initial 
result holds only in the case of PPML. For the Helpman et al. (2008) 2-stage procedure, the 
coefficient estimate of the variable turns statistically insignificant although still positive. The 
coefficient estimate of 0.772 in Column 3 suggest that a one standard deviation expansion in 
generalized trust level contributes positively to the number of traded products by 8.815 percentage 
points for an industry with an average contract intensity of score of 0.865. When I consider the 
distribution of generalized trust in my data, the result further indicates that the number of traded 
products for an industry with an average contractual friction score of 0.865 increase by 12.04 
percent in a country with generalized trust level at the 75th percentile compared to a country with 
generalized trust level at the 25th percentile. 
 
The subsequent four columns in the Table 5 focus on the intensive margin. As noted in section 3.2, 
I define it as the average value export per product and the intensity of exports in industry s in 
country i to j in period t. Because trust reduces contractual frictions, the marginal cost of production 
will fall while productivity rises. These will ultimately bear on the average value per product and 
intensity of exported products. Results displayed in Columns 5-8 are in support of my conjectures. 
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Specifically, the estimated coefficients of variables of interest in the Columns are consistently 
positive and statistically significant, suggesting that countries with high generalized trust level 
have higher average export per product and export intensities in contract intensive industries. In 
Columns 7-12 of Table A4 in the appendix, I document that these results are robust to accounting 
for other sources of comparative advantage and controlling for zero trade observations. In terms 
of economic importance, the reported estimated coefficient in Column 5 suggests that a one 
standard deviation expansion in generalized trust level contributes positively to average export per 
product by 62.925 percentage points for an industry with average contract intensity of 0.865. On 
the other hand, the result in Column 7 suggest a one standard deviation expansion in generalized 
trust level contributes positively to export intensities by 97.727 percentage points for an industry 
with average contract intensity of 0.865.  
 
Finally, to assess the relative importance of both margins I focus on the estimates using number of 
products (Columns 1 and 2) and export per product (Columns 6 and 7). Essentially, both margins 
follow a linear decomposition such that if they are in logs, any linear operator such as OLS should 
give estimates which when summed will add-up to the corresponding estimate for total bilateral 
exports in Column 5 and 7 of Table 1. While this conjecture is easily confirmed, the sizes of the 
estimated coefficient suggests a higher differential impact of generalized trust level on the 
intensive margin. For example, when I compare sizes of the coefficient estimates of 𝑧𝑠𝑻𝑖𝑡−1 in 
Colum 1 and 6, the results indicate that the intensive export margins accounts for about 69 percent 
increase in the total bilateral export flows of contract intensive industries. 
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5. Conclusion 
The literature on “domestic institutions, comparative advantage and international specialization” 
has largely focused on how better formal domestic institutional quality and contract enforcement 
shift a country’s comparative advantage towards industries that are more prone to contractual 
frictions (Nunn, 2007; Levchenko, 2007; Ma et al., 2010). This paper contributes to this literature 
by focusing on informal institution vis-á-vis generalized trust which has been unduly ignored. I 
argue that generalized trust as an informal contracting institution either complement or substitute 
formal contracting institutions. Therefore, high generalized trust should offer similar gains as in 
formal contracting institution, say, by reducing contractual frictions. I test this hypothesis using 
the factor proportion model developed by Rajan and Zingales (1998). Consistent with my 
expectation, the results are suggestive that countries endowed with high generalized trust level 
experience a relative better export performances in industries that are more prone to contractual 
frictions. This result holds even after controlling for formal domestic institutional quality and 
contract enforcement. On the one hand, my study reinforces the importance of generalized trust 
for improved economic performance. On the other hand, it offers explanation as to why a country 
though with weak formal domestic institutions may still specialize in industries that are more 
vulnerable to contractual frictions due to strong domestic informal institutions such as generalized 
trust. For what it is worth, trust is a more efficient and effective way of achieving compliance to a 
contract compared to formal institutions even where the latter is very strong. It is more cost 
effective because it can reduce the need for more expensive formal contracting with handshakes. 
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Table 1 – Baseline Regressions: Generalized Trust and Bilateral Exports  
This table evaluates the effect of generalized trust on (log) bilateral exports in contract intensive industries over the period spanning 
1996-2008. Industry contract intensity is measured using Nunn (2007)’s contract intensity index which measures, for each industry, 
the proportion of its intermediate inputs that are not traded on open markets and those that are reference priced in trade journals. 
Industry is defined as the 3-digit ISIC Revision 2 industry classification. Generalized trust variable is taken from the World Value 
Survey and is measured as the proportion of a country’s population that “agrees” with the statement, “Most people can be trusted”.  
 (log) Bilateral Export by Industry 
  [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] 𝑻𝑖𝑡−1 -6.907 -6.93 -7.052 -6.957   -6.748 
 [0.331]*** [0.327]*** [0.335]*** [0.327]***   [0.327]*** 𝑧𝑠𝑻𝑖𝑡−1 7.827 7.994 8.044 8.012 7.977 7.996 7.776 
 [0.362]*** [0.359]*** [0.369]*** [0.359]*** [0.359]*** [0.360]*** [0.360]*** 𝐿𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑗𝑡    -1.418 -1.307 -1.418 -1.419 -1.419  
  [0.026]*** [0.024]*** [0.026]*** [0.027]*** [0.027]***  𝐿𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑖𝑡   0.26 0.244 0.25   0.289 
  [0.022]*** [0.021]*** [0.022]***   [0.022]*** 𝐿𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑗𝑡   0.693 0.643 0.694   0.723 
  [0.021]*** [0.020]*** [0.021]***   [0.020]*** 𝐵𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑗   0.68 0.664 0.680 0.681 0.68  
  [0.095]*** [0.086]*** [0.095]*** [0.095]*** [0.095]***  𝐶𝑜𝑚𝐿𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑗  0.555 0.483 0.555 0.559 0.56  
  [0.055]*** [0.050]*** [0.055]*** [0.055]*** [0.055]***  𝐹𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑗𝑡    0.23 0.244 0.229 0.231 0.231 0.117 
  [0.044]*** [0.040]*** [0.044]*** [0.048]*** [0.048]*** [0.020]*** 𝐶𝑜𝑙𝑜𝑛𝑦𝑖𝑗  0.735 0.66 0.735 0.733 0.732  
  [0.087]*** [0.080]*** [0.087]*** [0.087]*** [0.087]***  𝑧𝑠  -2.633     
   [0.133]***     
        
Exporter FE YES YES YES YES NO NO NO 
Importer FE YES YES YES YES NO NO NO 
Industry FE YES YES NO NO YES NO YES 
Year FE YES YES YES NO NO NO YES 
Country-Pair FE NO NO NO NO NO NO YES 
Exporter-Year FE NO NO NO NO YES YES NO 
Importer-Year FE NO NO NO NO YES YES NO 
Industry-Year FE NO NO NO NO NO YES NO 
R-Square 0.49 0.62 0.49 0.62 0.63 0.63 0.67 
# Observations 1,094,412 1,094,412 1,094,412 1,094,412 1,094,412 1,094,412 1,094,360 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. Standard errors clustered at the country-pair level in squared brackets. 
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Table 2 – Generalized Trust and Bilateral Exports: Confounding Factors 
This table tests the robustness of the effect of generalized trust on (log) exports in contract intensive industries to controlling for other 
industry characteristics interacted with their respective country-level factor endowments. Indicators on factor industry intensities are 
taken from Braun (2003). Human capital intensity (sk) is the median from 1986-1995 of the industry’s mean wage over that of the whole 
manufacturing industry in the U.S. Physical capital intensity is the median of the gross fixed capital formation to value added ratio in the 
U.S. for the 1986-1995 period in each industry. External finance dependence (xf) is the median of the share of capital expenditures not 
financed with cash flows from operations in the U.S. for the 1986-1995 period in each industry. Natural Resources Intensity (ni) is a 
dummy variable that takes a value of 1 for the following industries (and 0 otherwise): Wood products, except furniture; Paper and 
products; Petroleum refineries; Misc. petroleum and coal products; other non-metallic mineral products; Iron and steel; and Non-ferrous 
metals.  
 (log) Bilateral Export by Industry 
  
Human 
Capital (H) 
Physical 
Capital (P) 
Financial 
Development 
(F) 
Natural 
Resources 
(Nr) All 
Rule of 
Law (Q) All 
Beta 
Coefficients 
  [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] 𝑧𝑠𝑻𝑖𝑡−1 7.937 7.021 6.051 7.831 5.39 3.394 3.609 0.475 
 [0.358]*** [0.359]*** [0.355]*** [0.345]*** [0.342]*** [0.465]*** [0.430]*** [0.057]*** 𝑠𝑘𝑠𝐻𝑖𝑡  1.473    1.277  1.275 0.836 
 [0.056]***   [0.055]*** [0.055]*** [0.036]*** 𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑃𝑖𝑡 0.513   0.032  0.028 0.049 
  [0.155]***  [0.156]  [0.156] [0.276] 𝑥𝑓𝑠𝐹𝑖𝑡   0.775  0.681  0.633 0.631 
   [0.021]*** [0.022]*** [0.021]*** [0.021]*** 𝑛𝑖𝑠𝑁𝑟𝑖𝑡   0.060 0.059  0.055 0.434 
    [0.003]*** [0.003]*** [0.003]*** [0.021]*** 𝑧𝑠𝑄𝑖𝑡     1.178 0.504 0.510 
      [0.066]*** [0.068]*** [0.068]*** 
R-Square 0.63 0.64 0.63 0.63 0.65 0.63 0.65 0.65 
# 
Observations 1,094,412 1,019,206 976,788 1,094,412 901,582 1,094,412 901,582 901,582 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. Standard errors clustered at the country-pair level in squared brackets. All regression 
contain unreported gravity model variables coefficients on colony, border, common border and FTA. In addition, they 
contain unreported industry and time-varying exporter and importer fixed effects. 
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 Table 3 – Generalized Trust and Bilateral Exports: Confounding Factors  
This table isolates the differential effect of generalized trust on (log) bilateral exports in contract intensive industries from 
the effect of other country characteristics by interacting the industry contract intensity indicator with different country 
characteristics. 
 (log) Bilateral Export by Industry 
 
Human 
Capital 
Physical 
Capital 
Financial 
Development 
Natural 
Resources 
Economic 
Development All 
  [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 𝑧𝑠𝑻𝑖𝑡−1 6.092 4.867 3.684 7.617 4.404 3.611 
 [0.403]*** [0.350]*** [0.372]*** [0.343]*** [0.425]*** [0.379]*** 𝑧𝑠𝐻𝑖𝑡  1.029     -0.472 
 [0.096]***    [0.141]*** 𝑠𝑘𝑠𝐻𝑖𝑡  1.435     1.214 
 [0.056]***    [0.056]*** 𝑧𝑠𝑃𝑖𝑡  0.9    0.934 
  [0.035]***   [0.038]*** 𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑃𝑖𝑡 0.915    0.63 
  [0.151]***   [0.157]*** 𝑧𝑠𝐹𝑖𝑡  0.902   -0.279 
   [0.061]***  [0.074]*** 𝑥𝑓𝑠𝐹𝑖𝑡   0.644   0.594 
   [0.019]***  [0.020]*** 𝑧𝑠𝑁𝑟𝑖𝑡   -0.125  -0.112 
    [0.007]*** [0.007]*** 𝑛𝑖𝑠𝑁𝑟𝑖𝑡   0.042  0.046 
    [0.002]*** [0.002]*** 𝑧𝑠𝐿𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑖𝑡    0.747 0.338 
     [0.040]*** [0.059]*** 
R-Square 0.61 0.62 0.61 0.61 0.61 0.63 
# Observations 1,094,412 1,019,206 976,788 1,094,412 1,094,412 901,582 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. Standard errors clustered at the country-pair level in squared brackets. All regression 
in the columns contain unreported gravity model variables coefficients on colony, border, common border and FTA. In 
addition, they contain unreported industry and time-varying exporter and importer fixed effects. 
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Table  4 - Generalized Trust and Bilateral Export: Zero Trade Observations 
This table tests the robustness of the baseline result on the differential effect of generalized trust on exports in 
contract intensive industries to controlling for zero trade observations using the Helpman et al. (2008) 2-stage 
estimation procedure and Santos and Tenreyro (2006) PPML estimator 
 Helpman et al. (2008)  PPML 
 
Pr(Bilateral Industry 
Export > 0)  
(log) Bilateral Industry 
Export  
(unlog) Bilateral Industry 
Export 
  [1]   [2]   [3] 𝑻𝑖𝑡−1 -2.697     
 [0.165]***    𝑧𝑠𝑻𝑖𝑡−1 3.515  3.100  2.856 
 [0.168]*** [0.546]*** [0.930]*** 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡1𝑖𝑗𝑡 -0.171     
 [0.026]***    𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡2𝑖𝑗𝑡 -0.483     
 [0.177]***    
R-Square     0.61     
# Observation 1,846,800   1,067,964   1,846,800 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. Standard errors clustered at the country-pair level in squared brackets. 
Column 1 contains unreported gravity model variables coefficient on importer and exporter (log) GDP pc, 
bilateral distance, colony, common border, colony, and FTA. They also contain unreported industry, year, 
exporter and importer fixed effects. Column 2 and 3 contain unreported gravity model variables coefficients 
on bilateral distance, colony, common border, colony, and FTA. They also contain unreported industry and 
time-varying exporter and importer fixed effects.  
 
 
 
Table  5 - Generalized Trust and Export Margins 
This table evaluates the differential effect of generalized trust level on the extensive and intensive exports margin of contract intensive 
industries. The extensive margin is defined as the (i) number of 6-digit HSC product exported in industry s by country i to j in period 
t; and (ii) the number of market destinations in industry s country i export to in period t. The intensive margin is defined as the (i) 
average value export per product in industry s by country i to j in period t; and (ii) the intensity of export in industry s by country i to j 
in period t. 
  Extensive Margin   Intensive Margin 
 (log) # of Products  (log) # of Markets  (log) Export Per Product  (log) Export Intensity 
  [1] [2]   [3] [4]   [5] [6]   [7] [8] 𝑻𝑖𝑡−1  -1.985   -0.409   -4.763   -7.387 
  [0.109]***   [0.337]***   [0.256]***   [0.449]*** 𝑧𝑠𝑻𝑖𝑡−1 2.467 2.400  0.772 0.776  5.511 5.376  8.559 8.295 
 [0.111]*** [0.112]*** [0.391]*** [0.382]** [0.284]*** [0.284]*** [0.497]*** [0.498]*** 
R-Square 0.73 0.8   0.88 0.86   0.45 0.49   0.73 0.76 
# Observation 1,094,412 1,094,360   24,504 24,506   1,094,412 1,094,360   1,089,158 1,089,101 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. Standard errors clustered at the country-pair level in squared brackets. Column 1, 3, 5 and 7 contain 
unreported industry, and time-varying exporter and importer fixed effects. They also contain unreported variables’ coefficients on 
bilateral distance, colony, common border, colony, and FTA. Column 2, 4, 6 and 8 contain unreported industry, year and country-pair 
fixed effects. They also contain unreported variables’ coefficients on importer and exporter (log) GDP pc and FTA.  
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Appendix 
Table A1 -  Summary Statistics 
This table shows basic descriptive statistics of variables employed in the empirical analysis. 
Variabe   # Observation   Mean   Std. Dev.   Min   Max 
(log) Bilateral Export 1,175,874  6.540  3.201  0.000  17.284 
(log) # Products 1,175,874  2.318  1.589  0.000  6.488 
(log) # Markets 26,542  4.094  1.012  0.000  5.375 
(log) Export Per Product 1,175,874  4.221  2.058  0.000  14.606 
(log) Export Intensity 1,168,884  -21.082  5.049  -43.183  -0.973 
(log) GDPpc exporter 2,000,700  8.325  1.634  4.721  11.464 
(log) GDP pc importer 2,000,700  8.325  1.634  4.721  11.464 
Generalized Trust  2,000,700  0.271  0.132  0.028  0.742 
(log) Distance 2,000,700  8.617  0.856  5.195  9.881 
Border  2,000,700  0.029  0.169  0.000  1.000 
Common Language 2,000,700  0.094  0.292  0.000  1.000 
FTA  2,000,700  0.161  0.368  0.000  1.000 
Colony  2,000,700  0.022  0.146  0.000  1.000 
Human Capital 2,000,700  2.572  0.656  1.053  3.664 
(log) Physical Capital 1,711,125  -4.286  1.771  -8.683  -0.548 
Natural Resource 2,000,700  5.003  7.823  0.000  55.312 
(log) Finance 1,798,200   3.527   0.997   -1.683   5.733 
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Table A2 – Industry Characteristics 
This table describes the industry characteristics used in this paper. Contract intensity (z1) measures for each industry, 
the proportion of its intermediate inputs that are not traded on organized exchange while contract intensity (z2) measures 
for each industry, the proportion of its intermediate inputs that are not traded on organized exchanged and those that 
are reference priced in trade journals.  Skill (sk) is the median from 1986-1995 of the industry’s mean wage over that 
of the whole manufacturing industry in the U.S. Physical capital intensity is the median of the gross fixed capital 
formation to value added ratio in the U.S. for the 1986-1995 period in each industry. External finance dependence (xf) 
is the median of the share of capital expenditures not financed with cash flows from operations in the U.S. for the 1986-
1995 period in each industry. Natural Resources Intensity (ni) is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 for the 
following industries (and 0 otherwise): Wood products, except furniture; Paper and products; Petroleum refineries; 
Misc. petroleum and coal products; other non-metallic mineral products; Iron and steel; and Non-ferrous metals. 
isic 
Contract 
Intensity (z1) 
Contract 
Intensity (z2) 
Skill Intensity 
(sk) 
Physical Capital 
Intensity (ci) 
Resource 
Intensity 
(ni) 
External 
Finance 
Dependence 
(xf) 
311 0.331 0.557 0.812 0.062 0 0.137 
313 0.713 0.949 1.135 0.062 0 0.077 
314 0.317 0.483 1.354 0.018 0 -0.450 
321 0.376 0.820 0.688 0.073 0 0.401 
322 0.745 0.975 0.502 0.019 0 0.029 
323 0.571 0.848 0.687 0.032 0 -0.140 
331 0.516 0.670 0.741 0.065 1 0.284 
332 0.568 0.910 0.698 0.039 0 0.236 
341 0.348 0.885 1.139 0.132 1 0.176 
342 0.713 0.995 0.934 0.052 0 0.204 
351 0.240 0.884 1.408 0.124 0 0.205 
352 0.490 0.946 1.209 0.060 0 0.219 
353 0.058 0.759 1.656 0.196 1 0.042 
354 0.395 0.895 1.153 0.074 1 0.334 
355 0.407 0.923 0.985 0.066 0 0.227 
356 0.408 0.985 0.827 0.088 0 1.140 
361 0.329 0.946 0.804 0.055 0 -0.150 
362 0.557 0.967 1.012 0.090 0 0.529 
369 0.377 0.963 0.952 0.068 1 0.062 
371 0.242 0.816 1.251 0.102 1 0.087 
372 0.160 0.460 1.098 0.101 1 0.006 
381 0.435 0.945 0.914 0.053 0 0.237 
382 0.764 0.975 1.119 0.058 0 0.445 
383 0.740 0.960 1.064 0.077 0 0.768 
384 0.859 0.985 1.322 0.071 0 0.307 
385 0.785 0.981 1.234 0.053 0 0.961 
390 0.547 0.863 0.755 0.039 0 0.470 
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Table A3 – Generalized Trust and Bilateral Exports  
This table tests the robustness of the baseline regression result to using alternative Nunn (2007) contract intensity indicator measured 
for each industry as, the proportion of its intermediate inputs that are not traded on open markets.  
  (log) Bilateral Industry Exports 
  [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] 𝑻𝑖𝑡−1 -2.412 -2.065 -1.534 -2.08   -1.973 
 [0.152]*** [0.146]*** [0.096]*** [0.147]***   [0.145]*** 𝑧𝑠𝑻𝑖𝑡−1 4.807 4.353 3.123 4.361 4.338 4.347 4.148 
 [0.244]*** [0.238]*** [0.101]*** [0.239]*** [0.238]*** [0.239]*** [0.239]*** 𝑧𝑠  -0.993     
   [0.061]***     
        
Exporter FE YES YES YES YES NO NO NO 
Importer FE YES YES YES YES NO NO NO 
Industry FE YES YES NO NO YES NO YES 
Year FE YES YES YES NO NO NO YES 
Country-Pair FE NO NO NO NO NO NO YES 
Exporter-Year FE NO NO NO NO YES YES NO 
Importer-Year FE NO NO NO NO YES YES NO 
Industry-Year FE NO NO NO NO NO YES NO 
R-Square 0.49 0.62 0.49 0.62 0.63 0.63 0.67 
# Observation 1,094,412 1,094,412 1,094,412 1,094,412 1,094,412 1,094,412 1,094,360 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. Standard errors clustered at the country-pair level in squared brackets. Colums 1-4 
contain unreported gravity model variables coefficient on importer and exporter (log) GDP pc, bilateral distance, 
colony, common border, colony, and FTA. Column 5-6 contain unreported gravity model variables coefficient as in 
previous columns excluding importer and exporter (log) GDP pc. Column 7 contain unreported importer and exporter 
(log) GDP pc. 
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Table  A4 - Generalized Trust and Export Margins 
This table tests the robustness of my results on the effect of generalized trust level on the extensive and intensive exports margin of contract intensive industries to controlling for other 
country and industry characteristics that determine industry specialization (i.e. Columns 1, 4, 7 and 10) and to controlling for zero observations using the Helpman et al. (2008) 2-stage 
estimation procedure (i.e. Columns 3, 6, 9 and 12) and Santos and Tenreyro (2006) PPML estimator (i.e. Columns 2, 5, 8 and 11). 
  Extensive Margin   Intensive Margin 
 # of Product  # of Markets  Export Per Product  Export Intensity 
 
Other 
Characters PPML HMR  
Other 
Characters PPML HMR  
Other 
Characters PPML HMR  
Other 
Characters PPML HMR 
  [1] [2] [3]   [4] [5] [6]   [7] [8] [9]   [10] [11] [12] 𝑧𝑠𝑻𝑖𝑡−1 1.539 0.97 0.348  1.087 0.515 9.273  3.851 7.055 4.71  5.637 5.653 4.925 
 [0.105]*** [0.165]*** [0.130]*** [0.369]*** [0.245]** [7.642]  [0.276]*** [1.188]*** [0.302]*** [0.491]*** [2.218]** [0.520]*** 𝑠𝑘𝑠𝐻𝑖𝑡  0.612    0.324    0.665    1.412   
 [0.025]***   [0.050]***   [0.040]***   [0.072]***  𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑃𝑖𝑡 0.569    0.302    -0.536    -0.502   
 [0.056]***   [0.165]*    [0.124]***   [0.221]**   𝑥𝑓𝑑𝑠𝑓𝑖𝑡 0.305    -0.068    0.376    0.773   
 [0.008]***   [0.024]***   [0.016]***   [0.027]***  𝑛𝑖𝑠𝑁𝑖𝑡 0.016    0.006    0.043    0.061   
 [0.001]***   [0.002]**    [0.002]***   [0.004]***  
R-Square 0.75   0.76   0.88   0.78   0.47   0.46   0.75   0.74 
#Observation 901,582 1,846,800 1,094,412   18,699 24,624 1,802   901,582 1,846,800 1,094,412   897,512 1,846,725 1,089,158 
 * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. Standard errors clustered at the country-pair level in squared brackets. Each Column contain unreported gravity model variables coefficient on 
bilateral distance, colony, common border, colony, and FTA. 
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1For example, Adler (2001) notes that trust reduces transaction costs by “replacing contracts with handshakes”. 
2
 This is based on survey question in EuroBarometer survey in 1996 which reads, “I would like to ask you a question 
about how much trust you have in people from various countries. For each, please tell me whether you have a lot of 
trust, some trust, not very much trust or no trust all?” 
3
 The results are however robust to using contemporaneous values of generalized trust indicator. 
4
 Castellacci and Natera (2011) use imputation methods to fill-in missing observations for different countries. We 
kindly refer the reader to the article for more detailed description about the data. 
5
 https://wits.worldbank.org/product_concordance.html 
6
 This number exceeds the number of importers in my dataset because I use all observations in the original BACI-
CEPII data to calculate it. Limiting my analysis to the number of importers in my data do not change my result in 
qualitative terms 
7
 Results available upon request. 
8
 Data on the rule of law is from the World Governance Indicator. 
9
 Data on physical and human capital are taken from the version 9 of the PWT table. Data on natural resource is taken 
from the World Development Indicator and is measured as the “total natural resources rents (% of GDP)”. 
10
 Data on financial development is from the World Development indicator and is measured as “Domestic credit to 
private sector by banks (% of GDP)”. 
                                                             
